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Woofter, Negro Problems in Cities, ch. II, The R8.pid.-Cfity
Growth, p. 26; Sterner, The Negro's Share, A Study of Income, Consumption, Housing, and Public ASMstanee, pp. 186209; Martin, Segregation of Negroes, 32 Mich.L.Rev. 721),
have made it impossible for many negroes to find decent
housing in large centers of population. The report of the
Committee on Negro Housing of the President's Conference
on Home Building and Home Ownership (1932) page 3,
states: "Cities of the North . . . have shown increases
ranging from 10 to 600 per cent. Chicago's Negro population in 1910 was 44,103; in 1930 it had increased to 233,903.
Philadelphia's increased from 84,459 in 1910 to 219,599 in
1930, andthat of New York . . . from 91,709 to 327,706."
In recent years there has been a large negro migration into
Southern California. The censns of 1940 shows an increase
of the colored population of Los Angeles from 67,348 in 1930
to 97,847 (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1942,
78th Congrcss, 1st Sess., House Document No. 53, p. 29),
and the war has accelcrated the pace of this migration.
Negroes migrating into urban communities have found
barriers at every turn. " Segregation . . . has kept the
Neero-occupied sections of cities throughout the country fatally unwholesome places, a. menace to the health, morals and
general decency of cities, and 'plague spots for race exploitation, friction and riots.'" (Report of the Committee on
Negro Housing of the President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, pp. 45 and 46.) The choice lies
between the continuation of such conditions and the expansion of urban negro districts. Race restriction' agreements,
undertaking to do what the state cannot, must yield to the
public interest in the sound development of the whole comInunity. The courts, as the agencies of the state confronted
with the problem of enforcing racial zoning by private agreements, must consider all of the factors that affect the public
interest. It is pertinent to recall the words of Judge Cardozo
in his concurring opinion in Adler v. Deegan, ~1 N.Y. 467,
484 [167 N.E. 705, 711]: "The Multiple Dwelling Act is
aimed at many evils, but most of all it is a measure to eradicate the slum. It seeks to bring about conditions whereby
healthy children shall be born, and healthy men and women
reared, in the dwellings of thc great metropolis. To have
such men an4 WOm\lP, is not a city concern merely. It is the
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concern of the whole state. Here is to be bred the citizenry
with which the State must do its work in the years that are
to come. The end to be achieved is more than the avoidance
of pestilence or contagion. The end to be achieved is the
quality of men and women . . . If the moral and physical '
fibre of its manhood and womanhood is not a State concern,
.
the question is, what is Y"
In the present case a residential district populated by
colored people now surrounds the restricted area on three
sides. The question whether the restricted area shall stand
as a, barrier against expansion of the negro district cannot
be determined entirely by :findings with regard to property
values and the interests of property Gwners. It is also necessary to determine whether maintenance of this barrier
would deprive the colored population of any feasible access
to additional housing and compress it within the inflexible
boundaries of its present district at the risk of a congestion
whose evils would inevitably burst the bounds of that district.
The trial court should therefore be directed to make' findings
as to the housing facilities available in the district occupied
by the colored population and to determine whether there
is a need for additional housing that would justify an. expansion of the district by absorption of the restricted area.

[Crim. No.. 4528. In Bank. Aug. 31, 1944.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. AMOS FRANKLIN CLAPP,
et aI., Appellants.
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Accomplices-Who Are.-Under
Pen. Code, § 1111, the mere fact that a witness is punishable for cooperation with the defendant in the illegal transaction does not make him an accomplice.
[2] Id.-Evidence-Accomplices-Who Are.-In case of crimes
requiring two or more persons for their commission, a specific
provision for punishing acts of certain participantp .supersedes Pen. Code, § 31, subjecting such participante in the
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Criminal Law, § 574; [3] Abortion, § 6.
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crioe of an accuspd to prosecution for its eommlsst":l, witr~
the result that tbey arc t:ot1'.ccomplices of the accused wit!:in
I·Cll. Cwe, § 1111. (Sec Code ('iv. Proc., § 1859.)
[3] Aborticn-Evidence-Co.roboration.-The p<'rson submitth,g
to ll::l. abortion, being subject to prosecution untler Pell. Cude,
§ 275, is not .ar. accompliee of the person performiub the operation mthin Pen. Code, § 1111, as amended in 1915, al,d her
testimony, although it must be corroborated under Pen. Cnc.e,
§ llO~, Illaybe corroborated by testimony of an accomplice.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of LOtI
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Stanley Musk, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for abortion. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
A. H. McConnell and Archie G. Cope for Appellant.
Robert VI. Kenny, Attorney General, T. G. Ne!;rich and
Fra:1k Hicharus, Deputies Attorney General, Fred N. Howser,
District Attorney, and Jere J. Sullivan, Deputy District .Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-DefendulltH appeal from judgments convicting thp.t::l of the crir..le of abortion and fron an order
der..ylng their t::lCltions for a new trial. Their cr>nvictions
were bneec ()n the te:::tir.:J.ony of Thekla Huntley, who under"e~t the iller,:':lI operation, and of Alice Huntley and Allee
Thur:::tan, her nother-in-In ...., and sister-in-law, "htl "ere
prcser..t during the operation, which took place in Tbchaa
Huntley's t.ome.
Defendants attack the judgn.ents on the ground that tl,e
evidence was insufficient to support the convicti<»nG. They
claim. thnt 1\11 tbree ,vitnE'sses were accomplices a~ld that thci::.tcst1'1!!l:('ny therE'fore needed corroboration undt;r secti")n 1111
of th.e Penal Code, whic:h provides: "A conviction cannc{
!le !lacl up""n tne testimony of an acc0mplire unless it Uf' e"'rr)borateu by such other eviclcnce as shall tend to C'Onn"d tae
defehJ~:lt with the com~lissi()n of the offense; 8:1'1 the C4c'l"ru~orlltl<·1II. h. n""t suff.cient if it mp.rdy shows the C'IJ!llm~~:..-m.
[3 J \VOt:lall on whom abortion 1~ c"~mittcd as IIcconLplic", bot",
139 A.L.R. 91:13. Sec, also, 1 Ca1.Jur. 114; 1 Al:J..Jur. 15L
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Cle ol!eose or the c;r\'O.'1.1UbLanr.es there.-l. _~ aCl)._~.bce .
is hereby ae£neJ. IJ,S ·:tlc who id liabje to p~ltltind fr It" the
idt,nt.icvl o[<.;llse cnargoo sgailllist the de!e~·i<UJt 6.'0 tr:1l1 in
the ~USe in ',vhich the te5tll~..ny of the 8cc()J>'ti,li~ is giVOl.. "
The court instructed the jury that the t8dt~y of ~e
accomplice is not corroborated by t!..t.\t of a~·the.r. (l'cu,,16
v. C"eo[}4t1t, 121 Cal. 554 [53 P. 10!:r2J i i:'eo1'l6 v. oter7.~'tl·rg,
111 Cal. :3 [43 1'. 19&] ; People v. B1t11.kcra, 2 CaLApr,_ l'J7
[1>4 r. 31'4, 370J; se~ 8 Cal.Jur. l'~O.) The quef:ticno \l~letLer
tile h\'o women present at the operati":r. were aeo."iDlplic~ of
dde.nda~t3 was left to the jury. T1e court lllstrueto? the
jury that Tbelm'l Huntley's testit::lOl>lY neeJe..Jwrroborntiuo
un,ler secti..n 1108 of the Penal Code, ..hien pruvVdeu H..tlt
ui>On n trial for abortion the testilnt.,tJ,y of tLew."lbnn 'IV}.'
underwent the operation ml!lSt be corrob >rato.l. The Cvurt
refused, however, to instruct the jury tJ.IlL Thclmll HhcUUCY'S
tel>til:J.ol!.Y needed corlobor:ttion by eVhlcn(;e fron. ",~ree
other thaD all accomplice. Since the ().u.rt ail-i not iclpG89
t},nt cO!J.dition, the jury was in effect lw,trllcte{i tht t~1e
testilnony of an accomplice WaG ac~cptar.le &Ii ~orrobolati().n
of '~1e:mll Huntley's testimony. It was therefore free to baso
its verdict of guilty on the testimony of tll'-' t11.rac WOJl>en,
even if it regarded 'rhellna Hlmtlcy's l!IlotJl\:lr-in-hw ll..."1d
s:ster-in-law as accul"pliccc, proviJed that Tl"ehMHllmtlt!y
"113 Hot herself an 1\C;t!u!nplice. The ('ourt':s refulkl t i:t.sbt1~ t
th(> jury that 'l'!:eI::J.a II untlcy's tcstim \l.Y l\Iee.....~e.l 0 l1'i'ob ••-·
ration. } y evidence other tha"l tc£ti1:sv,ny "'f an aco'r:a~ lk.oca.n
theref.·,re be appro-,'cd only if we Wag n.,t &il.\. a-mi',l1~
The qu...stion whether a wo~:ln who SHbntits tI· an ~Ue"al
operll:it,n is an aCf'.omplice of the defendant lin trY~l {«Ir H,e
aLortion mud be determined accorJin!; to t!l.c dc.5nitio.n of an
aCN!:lplicp in section 1111 of the Penal CCtde as -Inn "who is
liable to prosecution for the identiC'll o17t:11.8e cl,llrg",..-} ~:'ll!jt
th(> defelHb.nt on irinl." This definitiol".l. W1JJ; writtt.n id.1I the
Ja.w by the Legislature in 1915 (Sf.,<ti;.i. 1915. p. 7CO) Pofter th:a
C()urt, ill cOllilt.rllin~ section J 111, whkh f',)rwerly dill n· t :include Ii dennit.~un of 'lll accomplio', he~d tint accomplicell arc
pcrs._>tH! who part~cipa.te in tbe co:mmis.,tlcn of e crime, either
bj' c,l"I;mmitt.ing tbe a...t Jh'uctly, 8idmg in its co::ru:llssi",n, C)~
adylsir.g and e!J('oarl1P'ing its commi8Sibu. . (rearle •. C •. f"J!.
161C.1l.4~, 439 [11:1 P. 901, 39L.KA. N.3.7~J.)
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this construction of the section one who cooperated in any
manner with the defendant in committing the crime was an
accomplice, whether or not the act uf the accomplice was a
separate offense. This court stated, therefore, that one is an
accomplice in the sense of section 1111 "because of what he
had done and not because of the form of punishment which
the law may mete out for his acts," and that "Wherever
the law has denounced as a separate crime the particular act
of participation by an accessory or accomplice, the sole logical and legal effect is not to destroy the relationship of accomplice, but merely to effect a modification of section 31.
" (People v. Coffey, supra, p. 443.) Accordingly, a
woman was an accomplice if she submitted to an abortion
knowingly and cooperated with the person who performed it
(People v. Coffey, supra, p. 446), although then as now her
cooperation made her' punishable for the separate offense
specified in section 275 of the Penal Code.
In view of this construction of section 1111 as it was formerly worded, the Legislature added the definition of an accomplice to the section, repudiating the definition established
under the former law. [1] Under the statutory definition,
the mere fact that the witness is punishable for his cooperation with the defendant in the illegal transaction does not
make him an accomplice. It is necessary to determi.ne whether
sections 31 and 971 of the Penal Code or other provisions of
the criminal law subject the witness to prosecution under the
provisions that the defendant is accused of violating, or
whether the acts of the witness participating in the transaction constitute a separate and distinct offense. [2] If a
statutory provision so defines a crime that the participation
of two or more persons is necessary for its commission, but
prescribes punishment for the acts of certain participants
only, and another statutory provision prescribes punishment
for the acts of participants not subject to the first provision,
it is clear that the latter are criminally liable only under the
specific provision relating to their participation in the criminal transaction. The specific provision making the acts of
participation in the transaction a separate offense supersedes
the general provision in section 31 of the Penal Code that
such acts subject the participant in the crime of the accused to prosecution for its commission. (Cal. Code Civ.
Proc., § 1859; Carpenter v. Coast Surety Corp., 25 Cal.App.
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2d 209, 212 [77 P.2d 294]; Imperial County v. Garey, 61
Cal.App. 439, 444 [215 P. 89] ; Marshall v. Williams, 85 Cal.
App. 507, 511 [259 P. 970] ; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Continental Nat. Bank, 98 Cal.App. 523,533 [277 P. 354] i Talcott
v. Harbor Commissioners, 53 Cal. 199.) [3] Thus section
275 of the Penal Code prescribing punishment for a woman
who submits to an illegal operation precludes the application
of section 31 of the Penal Code under which she would be
punishable as principal for the crime of abortion. As the
court stated in People v. 'Vedder, 98 N.Y. 630, 631: "The statute plainly contemplates two persons as cooperating in the
commission of the crime, the one being the guilty person
against whom the penalties of the statute are directed, and
the other, the subject upon whose body the crime is committed. It then proceeds to define the respective crimes committed by the respective persons participating in the act, and
pronounces different penalties for the respective offenses.
It. is quite clear that the woman spoken of in the statute is
not regarded as one of the persons who could be guilty of the
crime described in the 294th section (abortion), and that she
could not therefore be indicted under that section.". (See,
also, People v. Blank, 283 N.Y. 526 [29 N.E.2d 73] i Dunnv.
People, 29 N.Y. 523 [86 Am.Dec. 319] iState of Minnesotil'v.
Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158 [2 N.W.2d 833, 139 A.L.R. 987] i
1 C.J.S. 323.) For similar reasons the giver and rcceiver of
a bribe (People v. Davis, 210 Cal. 540, 557 [293 P. 32]), and
the perjurer and the suborner (People v.Layman, 117 Cal.
App. 476, 479 [4 P.2d 244] ; People v. Nickell, 22 Cal.App2d
117,124 [70 P.2d 659]) are no longer accomplices undersection 1111. (See, also, In re Morton, 179 Cal. 510, 513 [177 P.
453] ; People v. Burness, 53 Cal.App.2d 214 [127 P.2d 623J i
People v. Gordon, 41 Cal.App.2d 226 [106 P.2d 208] i People
v. Williams, 7 Cal.App.2d 600 [46 P.2d 796].) Since section
275 of the Penal Code covers all acts committed by Thelma
Huntley in connection with the abortion, she was subject to
prosecution for an offense distinct from the crime of abortion
for which the defendants were on trial and was therefore not
an accomplice within the meaning of sec-tion 1111 of the Penal
Code. (People v. Wilson, 54 Cal.App.2d 434, 447 [129 P.2d
149] ; see, 139 A.L.R. 993).
The requirement of corroboration under section 1108 of

/
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the rez:.al Code relates to the testimony of any woman on
wh(,m an abortion was performed, whether she voluntarily
. subl!litteJ to the operation or was induced to do Sf) by force
or fraull. The section is designed to protect the defendant
agaiz:.st possible injustice where his statement and that of the
woman conflict. (See, 7 Wigmore, Evidence [1940], § 2061,
, p. 346.) Since this section has no bearing on the question
. whether the woman is an accomplice, its requircment of cor, roborating testimony cannot be cor.strued as excluding the
testimony of an accomplice for the corroboration of the
woman's testimony.
The judgments and order appealed from are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
SCHAUGR, J.-I dissent. I agree with the statement in
the majvrity opinion that "The <.;.uestion whether a woman
who submits to an illegal operation is an accomplice <.of the
defendant on trial for the ahortion must bc deter~ined accor~ing to the definition of au acconplice in section 1111 of
the Penal Codc as one 'who is liable to prosecution for the
identical offense charged against the defendant on trial.' "
But I submit that in any particular case thc answer to that
question must depend upon the facts of that casco The majority opinion declares also that "Ul~der the statutory definition. the nierc fact that the witness is punishable for his cooperation with the llcfendant in the illegal transaction does
not make hio an accomplice." In an acade::lic sense this
.' statement is true. But it is also true that, under the law (.f
California as it has heretofore been gencrally understood and
applied, if the coopcration of the witness made hir.l liable to
prosecution f(Jr the illelltical offense chargeJ against the defendant then such witness was an accomplice and the fact
that he m.ight alsv be llaMe to prusecution for a separate
c.ffense arisi:l.g out of the same acts d~d not abrogate his status
as an accomplice. Certainly it should not be deer:1ed to restore his character a::J.d integrity as a witness.
The maj<>rity opinion continues, "It is necessary to determine whether sections 31 and 971 of the Penal Code or other
provisions of the criminal law subject the witness to prose-
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cution under the provisions that the defendant is accused of,
violating, or whether the acts of tho witness partieipating
in the transaction constitute a separate and distinct offense. ",
(Italics added.) This statement is to be noted for its use of
the disjunctive "or." As I view the law the evidence' hex:e
establishes that the witness under discussion was liable to,
prosecution under the provisions that the defendann; are ae-,
cused of violating and that her acts constituted a separnte and
distinct offense. The majority opinion, however, asserts the
following propositions and conclusion: "If a statutory provision so defines a crime that the participation of two or more
persons is necessary for its commission, but prescribes punishment for the acts of certain participants only, and another
statutory provision prescribes punishment for the acts of
participants not subject to the first provision, it is clear that
the latter are criminally liable only under the specific provision relating to their participation in tht. eriminal transaction. The specific provision making the acts of partici.
pation in the transaction a separate offense supersedes tho
general provision in section 31 of the PenaZ Code that such
acts subject the participant in the crime of the acC1tsed to
prosecution for its commission. [Citing Code Civ. Proe.,
§ 1859, and civil cases.] Thus section 275 of the Penal Code'
prescribing punishment for a woman who submits to an illel=al
operation precludes the application of section 31 of the Penal
Code under which she would be punishable as principal for
the crime of abortion." (Italics added.)
,
I am unable to agree with either of the two last quoted
propositions or the conclusion. As is hereinafter pointed out
in more detail, section 275 of the Penal Code seems to be designed to cover explicitly certain situations which are not
covered by section 274 rathcr than to excuse from guilt of
violation of the last mentioned section one who by the clear
language' of sections 31 and 971 is guilty of violating it.
It does not clearly appear to me what implications are
intended by the above quoted language "If a statutory provision so defines a crime that the pariic·ipation of two or mQre
persons is necessary for its commission," ctc. Certainly there
is nothing in section 274 of the Penal Code upon which to
base an assumption that "the [unlawful] participation of
two or more persons ~Q necessary" for the comuUssion of
acts violating it. One per-<:on acting independcntly just as

/
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well 88 two or more acting in cooperation can violate that
section. The victim may be wholly unaware that the purpose
of a drug administered to, or an operation performed upon,
her is to produce an abortion. Under such circumstances she
would not be an accomplice but this would be true because
the facts proved did not bring her within the provisions of
section 31 of the Penal Code. The victim in such a case no
more "participates" in the crime than does the victim of
a murder, forcible rape, robbery, mayhem, or kidnaping-.
Certainly it would be true that if the participation of a
witness constituted exclusively a separate offense he would
not be an accomplice of the defendant, but it seems equally
obvious that if his participation were such as to make him
liable to prosecution for both the defendant's offense and a
separate offense he would irrefragably be an accomplice of
the defendant insofar as his competency as a witness in the
prosecution of the defendant is concerned. The mere fact
that the law created an additional offense as to him, whether
overlapping or not, for which he might or might not be prosecuted, would not change the legal character of his relationship to the defendant and the latter's crime.
The "principals" in a crime are defined in section 31 of
the Penal Code: "All persons concerned in the commission
of a crime . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or,
not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission . . . are principals in any crime so committed." (Italics
added.) . In the same tenor section 971 of the Penal Code
provides that "The distinction between an accessory before
the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first
and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; and all
persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether
they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid
and abet in its commission . . . shall hereafter be prosecuted,
tried, and punished as principals. . . ." (Italics added.)
Furthermore, contemplating apparently just such a situation
88 that which appears in this case; viz., one in which the
same act may violate more than one statute, the Legislature
enacted scction 654· of the Penal Code, protecting the offender
against double punishment by the provision that "An act
or omission which is made punishable in different ways by
different provisions of this code may be punished under either
of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under
more than one." (Italics !ldded.)
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Sections 1111 and 31 of the Penal Code, being parts of
the same code dealing with related subject matter, must be
read together. Section 1111 defines an accomplice "as one
who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged
against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testi.
mony of the accomplice is given." Section 31. specifies the
persons who are "liable to prosecution for the identical of·
fense charged against the defendant." It specifically declares
that" A.ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime,
whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet
in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and
encouraged its commission . . . are principals in any crimes
so committed." (Italics added.) It is difficult to conceive of
clearer language than that used in section 31. Under its
language no one but a principal "liable to prosecution for
the identical offense charged against the defendant" can be
an accomplice.
The object of the Legislature in this enactment was both
to simplify criminal procedure and to abolish the technicali.
ties of the common law which made the aider or abettor a
principal in the second degree and which forbade bringing
the accessory to trial until the principal had been convicted
or outlawed. (See 2 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 232.)
At the same time the Legislature recognized that the "evi·
dence of an accomplice, coming • from a tainted source, the
witness being, first, an infamous man, from his' own confession of guilt, and, second, a man usually testifying in the
hope of favor or the expectation of immunity, was not .en·
titled to the same consideration as the evidence ofa clean
man" (People v. Coffey (1911), 161 Cal. 433, 438 [119 P.
901, 39 L.R.A. N.S; 704]) and declared the policy of the
state that "A conviction cannot be :had upon the testimony
of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such otherevi~
dence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the com.
mission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient
if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the cir.
cumstances thereof." (Pen. Code, § 1111.) The definition.
of the word "accomplice" in section 1111 does not purport
to repudiate the provisions of section 31 but is, rather, dependent upon that section for definite intelligibility. Section
31 was enacted in 1872 and the Legislature certainly must be
presumed to have had the provisions of that section in mind
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when it, in 1915, amcndeJ the related section, 1111, to define
the wurd "accolIlplice," and used language which is made
certain and definite in it'> application to the subject matter
by reference to the earlier section.
There is a seemin~ Hug/lestion in th·J majority opinion that
it "as been use of some amendment in the law wroul~ht by
the l:mguage or the definition of accomplice in section 1111
that it was held in certain cases that a thief was not the accomplice of the receiver of his stolen property. I do not
perceive thtlt the language of the definition of accomplice as
set forth in I<cction 1111 of the Penal Code repeals or modifieM
in any way the provisions of gection 31 of the same coue. No
Iluthority ha\; been called to my attention which disputes the
proposition that "every person of legal responsibility, who
knowin{;ly nnd voluntarily co-operates with or aids or a8si£1..':I
or adyise3 or encourages another in the commission or a crime
j~ Ilt! IlcCUL."l}Jlicc." (P,;u'j.d.; v. Caffe',!! (1911), s·u1Jra. at pp . .,1.39410.) As long as sections 31 and 1111 rem:lin, in their pr('sent
form, :'IS p~rts of the Penal Code, just so long do " All persons
eonc~rned ill the cOlllmission of a crime . . . whether they
directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and
auct in its commission, or, not being present, haye advi'lcd
alld encouraged its commission," remain accomplices. They
remain accolllplices because by the effect of section 31 t~ey
:irc "liaule tu }Jrosecutioll for the identical ()lrensc [propC'rly]
ehnrgcu r.gdnst" any of their number arising out of th~ir
joint undertaking.
'1'11e majority opinion cites certain cases concerned 'with
briuery, perjury, and receiving stolen property as sapporting
the vicw promulgated. It would require unwurranteu c::tcnt
in this dissenting opinion to analyze each of those case'S or
eyen each of the types of crime mentioned. It is obvious that
nOlle of those cases constitutes actual authority for the pru}Jo·
I'itions or conclusion enunciated by the majority hcre. In my
opinion it is impraeticel to lay down a broad rulo which may
pro';, lerly determine in every case, regar(Uess of varying factuul details, whether a woman is or is not the accomplice of
a doctor who abort'> her. Each case presf:'llts inherently a
question of fact and should be governed not by a rulo of
thumb which the courts may declare but by the applicable
provisions of the Penal Code under the facts of the particuhtr
case. The same rule should apply in all types of crime. For
example we lllay take the crime of receidng stolen property.
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Certainly it is true that a receiver of stolen property is' not
the accomplice of the thief in the commission ot the theft if
that theft has been completely committed before the receiver
of the property is contacted by the thief. This is obviously
true not because of any court-made rule of law to the effect
that the receiver of stolen property cannot. be an accomplice
of the thief but because the receiver in such a case does not
factually come within the definition of accomplice. He has
not committed the theft directly nor has he. aided, abetted,
advised, or encouraged its commission. Hence, under sections
31 and 1111 he is not an accomplice. But I submit that if a
person, in advance of the commission of a theft, were to wilfully advise and encourage another to commit it, agreeing to
purchase and receive the specific property to be stolen, then
such person so advising and encouraging the theft should be
held guilty of the theft itself, as an accomplice, even though
he might also, upon actual receipt of the. property, be guilty
of the separate offense of receiving stolen property. But the
majority rule here, if followed, will exculpate him from guilt
of theft. So also the thief mayor may not, dependent upon
the facts of each particular case, be an accomplice of the
receiver of stolen property. Merely because he has stolen the
property and sold it, he is not necessarily an accomplice of
the receiver in violating section 496 of the Penal Code. That
section makes a specific intent a part of the offense denounced.
It declares that "Every person who for his own gain, or to
prevent the owner from again possessing his property, buys
or receives any personal property, knowing the same to have
been stolen . . . is punishable," etc. (Italics added.) A
thief, having the stolen property in his possession, normally
is interested in only one thing; viz., to dispose of it for his
own personal gain. The realization of gain for himself is the
controlling motive for his every action. In selling the property
to another his interel!lt in the transaction MMeil when it is sold,
delivered, and paid for. He would ordinarily have no interest whatsoever in aiding or abetting the receiver to receive,
hold, or handle the property for the latter's gain or to "prevent the owner from again possessing his property." Hence,
there is a rational ground for holding that the thief would
not, upon the facts, merely by reMon of the sale of the stolen
property to another, aid or abet the latter in his separate
offense. Again, however, the question is inherently one of
fact rather than of law.
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So in this case it is primarily a question of fact'whether
the witness 'l'helma Huntley was an accomplice. If she did
not know that an abortion was to be committed upon her, or,
knowing it was proposed, did not wilfully cooperate in or
encourage it, she would not be an accomplice. But if, with
full knowledge, she aided, abetted, advised, or encouraged
the defendants to violate section 274 of the Penal Code then
she is an accomplice and, by the express terms of section 31,
a principal in this case. The fact that she may also have
violated section 275 of the same code does not absolve her
from guilt for violation of section 274 nor can it alter the
facts which constitute her an accomplice and principal
therein. The sections do, to some extent, overlap but, as
previously suggested, section 275 seems obviously intended
to cover situations which are not covered by section 274,
rather than, as held by the majority, to eXCUlpate her from
guilt as a principal for violation of section 274 when she
dcliberately aids, abets, and encourages another to participate
in violating the section. Section 275 makes guilty of the offense there defined any "woman who solicits of any person
any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, and takes the
same, or who submits . . . to the use of any means whatever,
with the intent thereby to procure a miscarriage, unless the
same is necessary to preserve her life." The solicitation or
submission referred to in this section might take place with
the essential guilty intent on the part of the woman but entirely without any guilty knowledge on the part of the person
solicited. This, then, would constitute an offense entirely
separate from that defined in section 274, but it obviously
does not preclude the woman from aiding and abetting someone else in the violation of section 274.
Some of the mischief in the broad doctrine of the majority
that" The specific provision making the acts of participation
in the transaction a separate offense supersedes the general
provision in section 31 of the Penal Code that such acts subject the participant in the crime of the accused to prosecution
for its commission," may be shown by illustration. With that
doctrine in mind let us considcr some of the situations which
may arise under section 653f of the Penal Code. That section
provides that ., Every person who solicits another to offer or
accept or join in the offer or acceptance of a bribe, or to commit or join in the commission of murder, robbery, burglary,
grand theft, receiving stolen property, extortion, rape by
force and violence, perjury, subornation of perjury,' forgery,
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or kidnaping, is punishable by imprisonment in the county
jail not longer than one year or in the state prison not longer
than five years, or by fine of not more than five thousand
dollars. " The advantage to the leader of an organized gang
of criminals is obvious. If he personally remained aloof from
direct and personal participation in the crimes he solicited
his men to commit his liability to prosecution under section
653£ would, in the language of the majority, "preclude the
application of section 31 of the Penal Code" under which,
as the law has heretofore been understood, he would have been
liable as a principal for the crime actually committed, and he
would instead be subject only to the relatively light punishment prescribed by section 653f. That advantage to him could
be substantial not only as to major crimes of violence but
even as to the relatively minor offense of receiving stolen
property. That offense (Pen. Code, § 496bb) is declared to
be a felony and is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison not exceeding five years (Pen. Code, § 18). But under
section 653f he might be only fined or given a county jail
sentence.
The Legislature in this state has declared the policy that
accomplices must be corroborated if a conviction on their
tel!timony is to be sustained. That requirement reflects the
wisdom of lawmakers based on the experiences of mankind
over the centuries during which penal laws have been enacted
and administered. As stated in People v. Ooffey (1911), supra,
161 Cal. 433, 438, "Time has not changed the value of such
evidence." If exemptions in such laws (as to the corroboration of accomplices) are to be created, they should come
from the Legislature and not be innovated by the courts. This
court should be ever vigilant to protect, rather than to whittle
away, the safeguards which the people through the Legislature have thrown around their liberty. However righteous
the zeal to punish the guilty, the result of a salutary law
struck down may well be more unrighteous than for two (or
any number of) guilty individuals to escape punishment for
a particular offense.
.Upon the evidence in this case it seems cert.ain that if the
defendants are guilty of the offense charged, then so also is
the witness Thelma Huntley guilty of such offense.
The trial court erred in railing to properly instruct the
jury as to the necessity for corroboration of the witness and
the judgments and order appealed from should be reversed.
Carter, J., concurred.
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